There, between October 1974 and December 1975, he wrestled with a tough, impenetrable Communist regime; a populace that was alternately warm and xenophobic; and the repercussions of the American defeat in Southeast Asia. The experience began to clarify his views on the workings of the international system—and, most important, America’s place within it. He kept a diary by dictating thoughts and impressions into a tape recorder. These will be published in May in “The China Diary of George H.W. Bush,” edited and introduced by Jeffrey A . Engel. Excerpts:
October 21, 1974 In going to China I am asking myself, “Am I running away from something … [from] inflation, incivility in the press and Watergate and all the ugliness? Am I taking the easy way out?” The answer I think is “no,” because of the intrigue and fascination that is China …
People at the State Department seem scared to death about our China policy. [Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger keeps the cards so close to his chest that able officers … seem unwilling to take any kinds of initiative. It is my hope that I will be able to meet the next generation of China’s leaders—whomever they may prove to be. Everyone tells me that that is impossible. But my hyper-adrenaline, political instincts tell me that the fun of this job is going to be to try to do more.
October 22, 1974 Chairman Mao met with Denmark’s prime Minister and there is all kinds of speculation as to where Mao is. The Danes were not at liberty to say, being sworn to secrecy. Some think that Mao was out in the country[side] to see how the [ruling] group in Peking will do. Others feel that he is home because of his advanced years. But the point is people don’t know. They speculate about it, they talk about it. Here we are in a country of 800 million people and it is a well-kept secret. At least from our ears. Amazing, absolutely amazing.
October 27, 1974 On Saturday we climbed up the Western Hills with [Foreign Service officer] John and Martha Holdridge. A beautiful but tiring climb. There was a sign at the gate saying, “Do Not Pick the Red Leaves” and yet all through the climb we saw soldiers and kids carrying red leaves. Bright red fall colors. The path and the walk were a bit grubby. There was a lot of dust around. A lot of popsicle wrappers and paper wrappers. It reminded me of some of the spots in New York. I would have thought that the discipline extended to this kind of thing. There are propaganda speakers throughout the whole park.?They were not on at first. When they came on, four kids in gray Mao coats in front of us looked at each other and one of them put his hands up into his ears as if to fend off the announcements.
November 1, 1974 I went to call on [then-Vice Premier] Deng Xiaoping. He was a very short man. As we walked in we were ushered over in the middle of the room for a picture. Holdridge and I were flanking the very short Deng. We then moved on into the reception room where we had a long, good discussion with the Vice Premier … I gave him my thesis that there must be visible manifestations of progress for our China policy, so [as to] avoid some of the hyper-microscopic analyses that we are getting on other policies in the States. Deng seemed very much in control, clicking off minute agricultural population statistics, concerned about India, thought we hadn’t done enough at the time of the India-Pakistan war. I was too polite to ask them what they had done.
November 3, 1974 One of our men had an incident at the [Ming] Tombs yesterday. He was stopped by a PLA [People’s Liberation Army] man as he drove with his front wheels just past the line that says “no foreigners pass here” … A two and a half hour hassle followed, when finally other officers arrived and he was permitted to leave … [It] shows you the other side of the friendship, banquets and great decency. There is this other regimented, inflexible, unreasonable side … Another example. I asked for a map for my office. [State Department General Services officer] Mo Morin gave one to one of the Chinese to put on a frame. The carpenter came back and berated Morin saying that Taiwan was a different color from the rest of China and therefore the map was bad, etc. This process went on for quite a while and Mo could do nothing but take it.
November 17, 1974 It is annoying beyond belief to read the attacks in the Red News on the United States. China feels it must attack the United States—imperialist, exploiter of small nations, etc. I just have this inner feeling that these Chinese leaders do not subscribe to that view in its entirety … How does one balance that with their desire for frankness in dealing, their desire for openness, their desire to “keep their word” etc.? Also, would China understand it if we struck back in these areas? We don’t do it and I am not convinced we should. But I am wondering how they would feel if we attacked their closed system … the total lack of individual freedom.
November 26, 1974 People on his staff are scared to death of Kissinger. It is unbelievable. Too much so … “Is he coming? Is he coming? Is he late? Is he late?” Nobody is willing to bite the bullet and speak up … Pressures on him are immense, and the accomplishments immense, so one forgives the eccentric things. But there is a certain graciousness that is lacking. No question about it.
I attend, sitting next to the Secretary, meetings with Deng Xiaoping. Kissinger is brilliant in these talks. Tremendous sweep of history and a tremendous sweep of the world situation. He is at his best. It is a great contrast to the irritating manner he has of handling people. In the Wednesday morning meeting: “I want my staff. I want them all in this room. I want them right here now. Where are they?” All kinds of yelling of that nature goes on. I guess it is the way he keeps from getting ulcers at the pace he is working at.
December 16, 1974 The archeological exhibit, the agreement for which I signed when I first came from the U.S., went to the U.S. It is beautifully presented apparently in the [National] Gallery in Washington, but we blew a great opportunity to stand up for freedom of the press. The Chinese insisted that Israel, South Africa, South Korea journalists and one other not be permitted to go to the pre-press preview. So instead of standing up and insisting on it some deal was cut between the gallery, the State Department, and the Chinese under which the Chinese had their way. We must not capitulate on matters this fundamental in the United States … China is very vulnerable on human rights excesses just as the Soviet Union was. Some day sure as can be the Congress will turn its attention to these aspects of the Chinese policy. We must therefore not permit them to flaunt their way in the United States.
February 17, 1975 I [was] amazed, when I went back to the States, at the malaise, the tearing down of institutions, the discouragement there. I have more confidence in our country than the mood that was prevailing back home would have one believe one should have … So much depends on our own self-confidence in our ability to cope. If we project this confusion and failure and discouragement it will show up all around the world. People wonder anyway when they see commitments un-kept. I think of Cambodia, and I think of Vietnam, and I think of what that means to the Chinese government and others as they see us unable to fulfill commitments made … It is important to our relationship that they believe what we say and that we deal truthfully and openly and honestly with them. In spite of the fact that … much of their dealings have traditionally been through nuances and in great subtleties. I don’t think we must adopt the same method in dealing with them. We must be Americans. We must be what we are.
April 30, 1975 Went to the National Day reception for the Netherlands and there I heard, not through the State Department telegrams but through gossip at a reception, that the big, big men in Vietnam had surrendered. The Vietcong were there, three little guys about four feet high that rushed happily out of the room. The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese embassies are bedecked in flags and having understandable celebrations. Firecrackers are heard. It is a rather sad thing and you can sense the hostility and certainly the tension when I walk by certain groups at these receptions … I am a little annoyed … hearing about the surrender … from a drinking party.
May 29, 1975 I am continually amazed at how hard it is to get close to the Chinese. It is difficult work. I am convinced we see more of them, have better personal relations than others, but you can get just so close and that’s it … It is impossible to pick up the phone, ask somebody over, and have a meaningful discussion about Southeast Asia or Russia or someplace like that. It just can’t be done. If they have some business they want to talk to you about, they call you up, but that hasn’t happened on any major matters … for a long time.
July 30, 1975 Sounds that I will not forget. The early morning singing in the park—loud and usually very good tenor voices for the most part. The organized cadence of kids marching (“Y, er, Y, er”). The never ceasing honking of horns downtown in Peking, the jingle of bicycle bells, the laughter of the children as they play near the park, the blaring of the loudspeakers with the exercises of the propaganda whether it’s on a train, in a park, at a building site, wherever. The July and August sound of the crickets.
